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It is this fact that precludes any definite answers without further
litigation or new legislation. In the meantime, the most that can be
said is that complete reliance on either Hutcheson or Allen Bradley
has been renounced by the majority of the Court.
MARTIN

N.

ERWIN

Labor Law-Pre-Election v. Post-Election Relief Under the LMRDA
When Raymond Harvey sought to nominate himself for office
in the National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, he discovered that he was unable to do so since he was ineligible to be
a candidate. The union bylaws provided that a member could nominate only himself for office, and the union's constitution provided
that no one was eligible for nomination to a full-time union office
unless he had been a union member for five years and had served
at least 180 days in each of two of the three preceding years on
ships with union contracts. Harvey had not met the service requirement. 1 He sued the union president, Jesse Calhoon, to enjoin the
election, alleging violations of Title I of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. This Title guarantees equal
rights to all union members to nominate candidates2 and allows any
member whose rights are violated to bring a pre-election suit in a
federal district court for a remedy.3
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court in
Calhoon v. Harvey4 was whether plaintiff Harvey's rights under
Bradley, concurring in Pennington and dissenting in Jewel. In a separate
opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurred in both cases but dissented from the extra-unit bargaining rule.
This separate opinion raised many of the important problems inherent in
the opinion of the Court. Its basic position is that Mr. Justice White has
ignored the fundamental realities of collective bargaining and established
barriers to negotiation which will frustrate the congressional intent to promote labor peace and stability.
'Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486, 487 (2d Cir. 1963).
2 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 101(a) (1), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §
411(a) (1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA] provides:
Equal Rights.-Every member of a labor organization shall have
equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organizations, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution
and bylaws.
LMRDA § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1965).
'379 U.S. 134 (1964).
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Title I had been violated or whether his rights under Title IV
had been violated. Title IV provides that every union member in
good standing is eligible "to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) . . . "I

and allows only a post-election remedy by way of petition to the
Secretary of Labor who may direct a new election.'
The district court had dismissed the complaint, holding that it
did not have jurisdiction since a Title I violation was not alleged.7
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations did indicate a Title I violation.8 The Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit, accepting the contention of defendant Calhoon that the district court was correct in refusing to hear the case.
The Court refused to consider Title IV violations when determining if Title I had been violated, but discussed the provisions
of Title IV in clarifying its decision to deny relief under Title I.
In concurring, Mr. Justice Stewart accepted the possibility that a
Title IV violation might also violate Title I, rejecting the majority's
refusal to consider this." Mr. Justice Douglas dissented," adopting the opinion of the Second Circuit that the restrictions in this
case were a violation of Title I.
Section 101 (a) (1), part of labor's "bill of rights,"'1 2 guarantees
union members equal rights and privileges to nominate candidates
for union office subject to reasonable rules in the union's constitution and bylaws.'" Section 102 allows any person whose rights
secured under Title I have been infringed to bring an action for
appropriate civil relief (including injunctions) in a United States
district court.' 4 This remedy, unlike that provided in Title IV, 5 is
'LMRDA § 401(e), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1965).
'LMRDA § 402(a), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1965).
Harvey v. Calhoon, 221 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
s324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963).
° 379 U.S. at 139-40.
"Old. at 143.
1

Id. at 141.
This provision was an amendment to the original Kennedy-Ervin bill.
105 CONG. REc. 6475 (1959). Proposed by Senator McClellan, it was
amended by Senator Kuchel to provide the right of union members to sue
in federal courts. 105 CONG. REc. 6719-20 (1959). (Senator McClellan's
amendment had provided for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor.) For
a discussion of the legislative history of the act, including Title I, see Mc'

(1964).
Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) (1965).
Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1965).

ADAM s, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION
1173
1,73
U

LMRDA § 403, 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1965).
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not exclusive. Section 103 specifically preserves existing rights under
state and federal law.'"
An examination of Title IV clarifies the distinction between a
right to nominate and a right to be a candidate. Section 401(e)
provides that a union member's right to candidacy is "subject to...
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed."'1 Relief for violations of this right is provided by appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Exhaustion of internal union remedies or pursuit of these remedies
without a final decision within three months is a prerequisite to
this relief. Once this exhaustion requirement is met, the complaining union member may petition the Secretary, who must determine
if the restrictions on candidacy are not "reasonable" or not "uniIf he so finds, he may sue to have the election
formly imposed."'
invalidated. In section 403 this procedure is declared to be exclusive.' 9
An effective distinction has been drawn between offenses that
violate Title I, thus justifying pre-election relief, and offenses that
violate Title IV, justifying only post-election relief. The Senate
debate on Title I indicated this:
Mr. KUCHEL. I do not believe that in any fashion the equal
rights section touches what the provisions of the [union's] constitution or bylaws might be with respect to the right to run for
office.
In that connection, I should like to ask the author of the bill
[Mr. Kennedy] ... if he can shed any light on what may be in
the bill with respect to that problem.
Mr. KENNEDY. [T]he bill of rights must be read in conjunction with the remainder of the bill. [In Title IV] we find the
following language: (d) In any election . . . every member in
good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold
"73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1965).
'73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1965).
18173 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1965).
1 One court has recognized this exclusiveness by way of dictum:
Title IV of the LMRDA creates the right of candidacy and simultaneously vests but limited jurisdiction to grant redress for its violation. The more general provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §... 1337 [granting
federal jurisdiction in civil actions under acts of Congress that regulate commerce or protect trade] cannot expand the restricted scope
of jurisdiction conferred by the LMRDA.
Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers Union, 201 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Del.
1961), vacated, 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1962).
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office (subject to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)....
So other rights are guaranteed, in addition to the rights
in the bill of rights, and the general constitutional
guaranteed
20
rights.
The court accepted this distinction and held that plaintiffs had
not established a claim for relief, characterizing their complaint as
an attempt to sweep into the ambit of their right to sue in federal
court if they are denied an equal opportunity to nominate candidates under § 101(a) (1), a right to sue of they are not allowed
of his eligibility and
to nominate anyone they choose regardless
21
qualifications under union restrictions.
Error was found in the decision of the Second Circuit, which had
considered the "combined effect of the eligibility requirements and
the restriction to self-nomination. 2
By adopting this interpretation of Title I, the Court supported
a general congressional policy against intervention in union affairs
and refused to encroach upon the authority given the Secretary of
Labor by Title IV. Mr. Justice Black said:
Congress ... decided not to permit individuals to block or delay
union elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of Title
IV. Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony
with the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies. ... 23
The Secretary has discretion not to sue to invalidate every election in which a complaint is filed. The act, by allowing him to
investigate complaints for up to sixty days,24 has discouraged litigation. The Secretary may discover that no violation was committed,
or, as has happened when the violation was clear, the union may
act to remedy it." The investigation is conducted by the Office of
105 CONG. REc. 6720 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
21379 U.S. at 138.
2 d. at 139.
2 Id. at 140.
'LMRDA § 402(b), 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1965).
" Two recent examples illustrate this. On December 29, 1964, the executive board of the International Electrical Workers declared that incumbent
president James B. Carey, Jr., had defeated challenger Paul Jennings by
about 2,000 votes. Jennings appealed the election, and the Secretary of
Labor ordered an investigation that revealed irregularities in the tabulation
of votes. No suit was ever brought since the union immediately declared
Jennings the victor. Facts on File, April 1-7, 1965, p. 1275. In the most
recent United Steelworkers presidential election, challenger I. W. Abel de-
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Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports under authority
delegated by the Secretary. 6 Suit is brought only if the investigation
shows that the violations may have affected the outcome of the
27
election.
If suit is brought, the role of the court is narrow. Section
402(c) of the act limits a court's determination to whether an
election was held within the prescribed time or whether a Title IV
violation may have affected the outcome.2
If a new election is
ordered, the Secretary of Labor must supervise it, in conformity
with union constitution and bylaws, and certify the results.20
Title IV, which leaves most internal matters in the hands of
the union and does not subject the union to civil liability, did not
disturb organized labor as much as the "bill of rights," which was
opposed from its inception."0 In a House committee hearing, George
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, called Title I
a device by means of which union officials or unions themselves
as entities can be haled before .

.

. the Federal courts and com-

pelled to account for the manner in which its internal affairs are
being conducted.
A basic difficulty, as we see it, is that any effort to write a
detailed, legally enforcible code of internal procedures for all
unions into a Federal law must inevitably end up either in such
feated incumbent David J. McDonald by about 10,000 votes. Here the
Secretary was never called upon. Union tellers investigated 153 complaints,
two thirds of which had been filed by Abel forces. McDonald was unable
to cite a single solid case of fraud or illegal voting procedures, and the
investigators found none. Thus McDonald had no ground on which to
appeal the election. The union had handled its own affairs; litigation was
unnecessary. Business Week, May 1, 1965, pp. 49-50.
"6Riche, Union Election Challenges Under the LMRDA, 88 MONTHLY
LABOR REVIEw 1 (1965).
"7If the Secretary finds no indication that the outcome of an election
had been affected, he is not required to bring suit. Altman v. Wirtz, 56
L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964). This is analogous to the power given to
the General Counsel by the Taft-Hartley Act. Refusal of the General Counsel
to issue a complaint "is final and unappealable." Wellington Mill Div.,
West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir. 1964).
:' 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1965).
'Ibid. See United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960), in which Mr. Justice Douglas said (concerning a collective bargaining dispute): "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence [as the labor arbitrator] to bear upon
the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed."
Id. at 582. See also Summers, Judicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 405 (1958); Strauss & Willner, Government
Regulation of Local Union Democracy, 4 LAB. LJ. 519 (1953).
" McADAMS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 113-41.
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general terms as to be susceptible of almost any interpretation,
and hence a breeding ground for litigation, or as a strait-jacket
which would inhibit obviously reasonable and proper union practices. 81
But the "bill of rights" remained, and judicial action has now
alleviated many of the fears of organized labor.
The policy of Congress toward labor is implicit in a provision
of Title I that deters union members from bringing suit, relying
instead upon union procedures. Section 101 (a) (4) provides that before a union member may sue for a violation of Title I, he "may be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures within the union
(but not to exceed a four month [as opposed to three months under
Title IV] lapse of time.)""2 When suits were filed before the member had pursued his union remedies for four months, the courts had
to decide if fulfilment of this procedural requirement was (1) necessary to jurisdiction, (2) unnecessary to jurisdiction, or (3) necessary, but waivable in certain circumstances.
An explanation by Senator Kennedy indicated that fulfilment of
this requirement was unnecessary to jurisdiction insofar as the
courts were concerned. He did, however, deem the requirement to
be applicable to union members,3 3 so that a union could discipline a
member for breach of the restriction though it could not prevent
him from bringing suit. 4 In Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
1Hearings Before Joint Subcommittee on Labor-Management Reform
Legislation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1515 (1959). Meany also said: "Every Chairman of a
local union meeting will be acting under shadow of a court suit each time
he makes a ruling on conduct of the meeting." 105 CONG. REc. (Daily
Appendix) 6402 (1959).
a'LMRDA § 101(a) (4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4)
(1965). The four-month period is apparently measured from the time the
appeal is initiated, rather than from the time of the violation, though no
court has clearly stated this. See McCrav v. United Ass'n of journeymen,
341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 1965). For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement see O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue
Under the Landrum-Grijfin Act, 14 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 215 (1965).
"8Nor is the intent or purpose of the provision to invalidate the...
decisions of many years standing which require, or do not require,
the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention.
For example, the National Labor Relations Board is not prohibited
from entertaining charges by a member against a labor organization
even though 4 months has not elapsed.

105

CONG. REc.

17899 (1959).

" See McCraw v. United Ass'n of journeymen, 341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th
Cir. 1965).
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Artists 5 the Second Circuit concluded that fulfilment of the exhaus-

tion requirement was necessary but waivable since the statute used
the word may instead of must. In this case the Second Circuit
waived the requirement because here the union remedy was uncertain and had not been brought to the plaintiff's attention, the violation was clear and undisputed, and the injury was immediate and
not compensable by damages. 36 Other courts have followed this
result, developing a doctrine of futility by accepting cases if the
union appeal procedures would be utterly useless or unduly complicated. 7
The courts will apparently apply the same rationale when considering the exhaustion requirement of Title IV. Under Title IV
a union member may petition the Secretary for relief after invoking
internal union remedies for three months. In practice the Secretary
has accepted cases in which remedies had not been pursued for the
statutory period.," One district court has indicated that it would
accept a case brought prematurely when appeal within the union
would be futile.39
The specific requirement for exhaustion of remedies and the
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 81.
8 McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th
Cir. 1965) (case heard since time elapsed); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1964) (no appeal was necessary when
it "would be a futility") ; Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 321
F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 1963) (hearing denied until internal appeal attempted); Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277
(W.D.N.C. 1963). In the latter case, the court accepted jurisdiction since
appeal was impractical because the discharged union member would have
to protest his discharge and be reinstated before he could begin his appeal.
Id. at 280. A federal district court in California has required exhaustion
even if futile. Smith v. General Truck Drivers Union, 181 F. Supp. 14
(S.D. Cal. 1960). The court cited a California state court decision requiring exhaustion unless it could be held as a matter of law that such procedure
would be to no avail. Id. at 18. A more liberal view has now been taken
by the Second Circuit. In Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
88

1964), it held: "Where . . . conceded facts show a serious violation of a

fundamental right, we hold that plaintiffs need not exhaust their union
remedies." Id. at 219. (Observe that Calhoon reversed this court's interpretation of section 101(a) (1) of the LMRDA.)
88 Wirtz v. Local 125, Int'l Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio
1964).
"Id. at 595. The court approved the "futility" doctrine as stated in
Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 1962) (appeal unnecessary
when persons it was directed against were to hear it, but refused to hear
the Secretary's complaint since it appeared that appeal was not futile).
(The Secretary contended that the exhaustion requirement did not bind
the court; he did not argue that appeal was futile.)
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reliance on the Secretary of Labor support the congressional policy
of allowing unions the greatest possible latitude in handling their
internal affairs. Before the ruling in Calhoon, several district courts
had heard cases alleging Title I violations and had given effect to
this policy, denying pre-election relief and holding that a Title IV,
not a Title I, violation was alleged.4"
Calhoon represents a functional interpretation of the act. It
achieves a delicate balance between union freedom and individual
justice. The Court understood that Congress did not intend restrictions concerning candidacy, whether "reasonable" or unreasonable, to constitute a Title I violation. Both the legislative history
and the policy implicit in the other provisions of the act justify
this conclusion. The act seeks to prevent union abuse in its internal
procedures, not to establish a means of ignoring those procedures.
The Supreme Court, though denying plaintiffs an immediate remedy,
has upheld the congressional policy of relying upon union procedures as long as they effectively protect the rights of union members guaranteed in the act.
GEORGE CARsoN II

Practice and Procedure-Res Judicata in Parent's Suit for Medical
Expenses and Loss of Services
The recent North Carolina decision of Kleibor v. Rogers' restates the majority rule that, following an injury to his minor child,
a father is not barred from bringing an action for medical expenses
and loss of services and earnings of the infant when the infant has
failed on the merits in a prior suit based on the same occurrence.'
" Jackson v. National Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 221 F. Supp. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Jackson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F.
Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp.
307 (D. Del. 1961); Johnson v. San Diego Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp.
444 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
-265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965). The case arises out of an injury
to plaintiff's nine-year-old son. Judgment for the defendant in a prior
action by the mother as next friend was held not to be res judicata in
the father's action.
I See cases collected in Annot., 133 A.L.R. 181, 201-02 (1941). For other
North Carolina cases see, e.g., Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d
925 (1955); Rabil v. Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938); Thigpen v.
Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N.C. 97, 65 S.E. 750 (1909). The rule was
criticized and the application of res judicata in these cases was urged in
North Carolina Case Law--Judgments, 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 461, 462 (1958).

